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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Key stylised facts regarding portfolio equity capital flows 
Portfolio equity capital flows have grown significantly and have raised their share of total 
capital flows of all kinds to EMCs. Such portfolio equity flows have been marked by 
substantial volatility and a great degree of concentration. Indeed the pattern of winners and 
losers in capturing shares of global flows into EMCs changes markedly from period to 
period. There is also evidence of growing competition for such portfolio equity capital 
flows among EMCs. 
 
Determinants of the volume and direction of portfolio equity flows are complex and vary 
from time to time. 
Cyclical factors such as global liquidity levels interact with other conjunctural factors as 
well as structural factors to determine how portfolio equity capital flows grow and which 
EMCs they head towards.  
 
Key policy questions are therefore raised 
Macro-economic management faces dilemmas as a result of the size and volatility of such 
portfolio equity flows. Other important questions that policy makers have to address 
include the balance between portfolio equity capital flows and other types of flows as well 
as how to manage the risks that appear inherent in the nature of such capital flows. 
 
Policy prescriptions 
In essence, this paper concludes that the following broad areas of policy action need to be 
considered: 
 
1.  Macro-economic policies need to be vigilant: Sound macroeconomic management 
(dealing with the “trilemma”) should be combined with effective macro prudential 
surveillance to monitor the potential unwinding of global imbalances and their 
consequences for the domestic financial system and domestic policy mix of the EMCs 
and to the portfolio strategies of international investors; 
 
2.  Financial markets need to be developed further: Development of deep, transparent 
and liquid domestic stock markets in parallel with steps to foster debt markets are 
essential parts of reforms to the institutional framework and to a systematic reduction of 
risks to private investors;  
 
3.  Well-planned capital account liberalization: Capital account opening  needs to be 
structured in a manner that will support and reinforce financial market development 
policies; and 
 
4.  A strengthened framework for financial policy transparency should help inform 
global investors of the quality of domestic markets and regulatory governance and thus 
help better align investor perceptions of risk with the actual risks. 
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Section 1: Introduction  
 
This paper studies trends in the flows of portfolio equity capital to Emerging Market 
Countries (EMCs) and assesses implications for policy makers. 
 
Definitions 
There is no single, universally accepted definition of EMCs. We have chosen a broad 
definition that is used by major investors and their supporting agencies such those who 
construct stock indices for various categories of countries. A full list and explanation of 
EMCs is given in Annex 1. 
 
Motivation for the paper 
Net inward portfolio capital flows to emerging market countries (EMCs) have fluctuated 
significantly in recent years. Just before the onset of the Asian financial crisis in 1996, net 
inward portfolio equity flows of USD32.9bn were recorded flowing to all developing 
countries. This fell sharply to USD6.7bn in 1998, rebounded somewhat to around 
USD12bn during the global equity boom in 1999–2000, fell again in 2001-02 as this equity 
boom turned into bust and then rose sharply to around USD25bn in 2003–04.  
 
The size and volatility of these flows have created substantial problems for policy makers 
in EMCs besides raising important questions for private investors as well. In the past two 
decades, EMCs have witnessed a series of financial crises some of which many analysts 
trace to the abrupt manner in which capital flows generally,including portfolio equity   
flows can shift pace and direction. The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 resulted in 
substantial contraction of output and incomes in a range of countries including Indonesia, 
Thailand, Korea and Malaysia, countries which had otherwise been successful in economic 
development. The rapidity with which a crisis that started in Southeast Asia with the 
devaluation of the Thai Baht in July 1997 spread to countries in other regions (Korea in 
December 1997 and Russia in August 1998) raised the issue of whether policy makers had 
been too quick to open their capital accounts without putting in place appropriate other 
policy measures to manage the potential negative effects of capital flows and their volatility 
 
In particular, policy makers have been concerned by a number of issues which are 
addressed in this paper: 
 
•  First, sizeable capital flows have compounded policy dilemmas. A key reason for 
the crisis in Southeast Asia was the attempt by policy makers there to maintain an 
exchange rate regime that was not consistent with separately managed monetary 
policy while also opening their capital accounts. In the presence of large capital 
                                                 
1 Paper prepared by Manu Bhaskaran, V Sundararajan and Harinder Kohli, directors of the Centennial Group for the 
Emerging Markets Forum for its inaugural meeting at Templeton College, Oxford 9-11 December 2005. We are grateful 
to our research assistants, Daniel Soh and Harpaul Kohli, for their help in putting together the data analysis in this paper.  
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inflows, Southeast Asian policy makers in 1995-97 had great difficulty containing 
the overheating of their economies (reflected in rising inflation rates and 
deteriorating current account deficits) through tight monetary policies while also 
trying to keep their exchange rates within target ranges. Speculative capital flows – 
a good part of it in the form of equity flows – overwhelmed their efforts. 
 
•  Second, the abruptness and speed of reversal of capital flows has also compounded 
economic problems in EMCs. In 1997-98, the sudden loss of confidence in 
Southeast Asian economies after the Thai Baht devaluation led to highly disruptive 
outflows of  capital including portfolio equity, depressing the value of equity 
holdings and leading to abrupt monetary tightening. These factors compounded an 
emerging slowdown, converting it into a massive crisis.  
 
This paper aims to understand as best as possible the underlying forces determining the 
pattern of inward portfolio equity flows to EMCs, surveys recent studies and analyses of 
the subject and concludes with a review of the implications for policy and strategy. 
 
Organisation of the paper 
The paper is organised as follows. After this brief introduction: 
  
•  Section 2 will present data on capital flows and will sketch out important 
features of portfolio flows—their growth, volatility and how they stand in 
relation to other forms of capital flows. 
 
•  Section 3 will then assess and review some of the determinants of portfolio 
equity flows. 
 
•  Section 4 will review several recent studies on the consequences and 
implications of portfolio capital flows in order to identify the critical issues 
facing EMCs.  
 
•  We will then review the literature on appropriate policy towards portfolio equity 
flows and survey actual policy responses by EMCs in different circumstances. 
Selected case studies will be reviewed briefly on actual country experiences.  
 
•  Finally, the paper presents a series of conclusions on areas for policy action and 
further research. 
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Section 2: Trends in Portfolio Flows 
 
Before discussing individual components of portfolio inflows, it is useful to review the 
evolution of the overall size and regional trends in private capital inflows during the recent 
past. Charts 1 and 2 below show total portfolio inflows (portfolio equity and portfolio debt) 
by region (Americas, Asia, Middle East, Europe and Central Asia and Sub Sahara Africa) 
during the past 10 years in billions of US Dollar as well as percent of GDP. A breakdown 
of regional inflows total flows (equity, debt, FDI and bank loans) is shown in Annexes 2-5 
at the end of the report. Overall, between 1994 and 2004, US$740 billion flowed into EMC. 
Of this, $360 billion or over half went to Asia and about US$200 billion or a third to the 
Americas. 
 
Chart 1    Chart 2 
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Sources: Collated by Centennial Group from the IMF's IFS, the World Bank, and Taiwan’s Central Bank;  
also, to fill in missing data, CEIC Data and calculations based on the India’s and Indonesia’s central banks. 
 
In 2004, private equity flows accounted for US$248 billion out of US$340 billion total 
portfolio flows. An analysis of the long-term trend in equity portfolio capital inflows brings 
out the following patterns as shown in Charts 3 and 4: 
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Chart 3    Chart 4 
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Sources: Collated by Centennial Group from the IMF's IFS, the Central Bank of Taiwan; CEIC Data and 
calculations based on the Reserve Bank of India and Indonesia’s Central Bank. 
 
We now look at a number of stylised facts regarding portfolio equity capital flows into 
EMCs. In much of the discussion to follow, we have found it useful to differentiate 
different sub-periods in this long period. Before 1990, we had a period of limited openness 
where only a few emerging markets were open to foreign investment—such as Malaysia. 
The next few years, roughly from 1991 to 1996 saw a progressive opening of equity 
markets by EMCs, resulting in large inflows during that period. There followed a period of 
crisis in 1997–98 in the aftermath of the devaluation of the Thai Baht. Finally, there is the 
current period of substantial opening and large capital flows in all regions. 
 
2.1  Significant changes in pattern of winners and losers 
First, the top ten recipients of total portfolio inflows between 1994 and 2004 (Table 1) have 
changed significantly, with Brazil, Argentina, Thailand and Indonesia dropping out and 
Taiwan, Poland, South Africa and Czech Republic making the latest top ten.  Mexico in the 
Americas, Korea, China and India in Asia, and Hungary and Turkey in Europe made the 
list in both periods. Taiwan rose from 11
th  rank to 1
st rank in the latest period. Reflecting 
the changing relative economic prospects of the two regions, while in 1993/4 the top three 
recipient countries were from Latin America, last year the top four countries were from 
Asia and their combined inflows twice the amount received by the next six countries.   
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Table 1: Top Ten Countries: Total Portfolio Investment into Emerging Markets 
  Average Between 1993-1994  Average Between 2003-2004 
1.   Brazil  30.3  Taiwan (China)   23.5 
2. Argentina  22.5  Korea  20.8 
3. Mexico  18.5  China  10.8 
4. Korea  9.9  India  9.2 
5. Thailand  3.9  Poland  7.3 
6. China  3.7  Turkey  6.7 
7. India  3.4  Hungary  5.1 
8. Hungary  3.1  Mexico  5.0 
9. Indonesia  2.8  South  Africa  4.0 
10.  Turkey  2.8  Czech Republic     3.3 
Sources: Collated by Centennial Group from the IMF's IFS and the Central Bank of Taiwan; also, to fill in 
missing data, CEIC Data and calculations based on the Reserve Bank of India and  Indonesia’s Central Bank. 
2.2  Portfolio equity flows have grown hugely in volume 
Second, there has been significant growth in the volume of portfolio equity inflows (Charts 
3 and 4 and Table 2) during the past twenty years. But, this has not been true for all regions 
in the EMC universe. Asia and Emerging Europe/Africa saw significant growth while Latin 
America received rising flows until 1996, since when flows have been very modest.  
 
Table 2: Long-Term Trends in Portfolio Equity Investment into EMC Region 
1985-
2004 
1985-90  1991-96  1997-98  1999-
2004 
Period 




Crisis  Increased 
Openness
Emerging Market Region  USD Billions 
Asia
(1) 287.6 4.5  66.9 9.6    206.6
EMEA
(2) 81.2 -1.4 18.7 24.6 39.3
Latin America  89.4 3.2 72.6 11.1  2.4
Emerging Market Total  458.3  6.3  158.2  45.4   248.4
Sources: Collated by Centennial Group from the IMF's IFS, the Central Bank of Taiwan; also, to fill in 
missing data, CEIC Data and calculations based on the Reserve Bank of India and Indonesia’s Central Bank. 
Notes: 
  (1) China and Malaysia 2004 values estimated from 2003 data; No Malaysia data before 2002; No 
Philippines data before 1996. 
 (2) EMEA = Europe, Middle East and Africa. Large outflows in 1985–90 mainly due to outflows from South 
Africa during the late apartheid period.  
 
2.3  Portfolio equity flows are highly volatile 
Third, portfolio equity flows have been marked by substantial volatility. There were even 
some years of negative flows when such capital was actually flowing out of some regions. 
Tables 2 and 3, and Chart 6 show the long term accumulated portfolio equity capital 
inflows, broken down by different sub-periods as explained above. For instance, Asian 
EMCs saw an explosion of portfolio equity inflows in 1991–96, followed by a collapse in 
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the crisis years of 1997-98 after which there was another explosion of portfolio equity 
inflows in recent years.  
 
Chart 6 plotted the volatilities of the various types of global capital inflows to EMCs over 
the last 2 decades. The volatilities were computed using the 5 year trailing standardised 
standard deviations of  different  types of capital inflows.  
 
•  FDI inflows, being most stable, exhibited consistently low and steady volatility over 
the years.  
 
•  Similarly, volatility of equity portfolio inflows has declined steadily since 1989 and 
remained moderate since the mid nineties..  
 
•  On the other hand, debt inflows, being most volatile,showed a plunge in volatility 
during 1989-1996,  but volatility surged at an exploding pace soon after the Asian 
crisis. Volatility of debt inflows remained the highest among the three types of  
inflows for most of the years in the last 2 decades.  
 
Table 3 examines the volatilities of capital inflows into EMCs for different sub periods.  
 
•  In the initial period of limited openness (1985–90), capital inflows from other 
investments recorded the highest volatility among  all other inflows. Volatilities of 
both equity and debt inflows in this early stage are significantly high and topped 
that for all subsequent sub-periods.  
 
•  Since the early liberalisation stage in 1991, the volatility of equity portfolio inflows 
has shrunk to less than a third of that in 1985–90. Likewise, the volatility of debt 
inflows remained fairly low during the 1990s.  
 
•  However, the recent  period(1999-2004) saw a sharp rebound in the volatility of 
debt inflows after the crisis. Volatility of foreign direct investment inflows, on the 
contrary, has remained fairly stable and low over the last 2 decades.  
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Table 3: Standardised Standard Deviations of Global Capital Inflows 
1985-2004 1985-90  1991-96  1997-98  1999-2004 Period 




Crisis  Increased 
Openness 
Type of Capital Inflow  Standardised Standard Deviation 
Equity Portfolio Inflows  0.91 1.57 0.52 0.43  0.47
Debt Inflows
  1.03 1.82 0.47 0.27 1.20
Foreign Direct 
Investment   0.71 0.35 0.44 0.01  0.13
Other Investment Inflows  2.01 -2.02 0.74 2.09  2.76
Total Investment Inflows  0.72 0.74 0.38 0.28  0.33
Source: Collated by Centennial Group from International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics 
Databases, Taiwan’s Central Bank, Malaysia’s Department of Statistics, the Reserve Bank of India, 
Indonesia’s Central Bank and the Wall Street Journal. 
 
2.4  Portfolio equity capital tends to be concentrated 
Fourth, portfolio equity inflows have been marked by their concentration. Asia has tended 
to dominate these flows into EMCs in several though not all periods. Recently, this Asian 
domination has been increasing. Latin America’s share has been in a secular decline after 
peaking after the initial period of opening up in Latin America in the late 1980s. 
 
 
Table 4: Regional Shares of Portfolio Equity Capital into EMC Region 
1985-
2004 
1985-90  1991-96  1997-98  1999-
2004 
Period 




Crisis  Increased 
Openness
Emerging Market Region  Percentage of total portfolio equity inflows to EMCs 
Asia
(1) 62.8% 71.0% 42.3% 21.1% 83.2%
EMEA
(2) 17.7% -22.3% 11.8% 54.3% 15.8%
Latin America  19.5% 51.3% 45.9% 24.6%  1.0%
Sources: Collated by Centennial Group from the IMF's IFS, the Central Bank of Taiwan; CEIC Data and 
calculations based on the Reserve Bank of India and Indonesia’s Central Bank. 
Notes: 
  (1) China and Malaysia 2004 values estimated from 2003 data; No Malaysia data before 2002; No 
Philippines data before 1996. 
 (2) EMEA = Europe, Middle East and Africa. Large disinvestment in 1985–90 mainly due to disinvestment 
from South Africa during the late apartheid period.  
 
Many emerging countries in Asia also competing for international capital implemented 
intensive reforms in their capital markets after the crisis, supported by policy makers’ 
growing interest in developing their capital markets. Together with Asia’s reviving 
economic climate, huge inflows of global opportunistic equity capital were thus drawn into 
Asia. In other words, the figures indicated the success of emerging countries in Asia in 
taking a progressively larger slice of global equity portfolio capital funds from other 
regions.  
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The EMEA region’s share of equity portfolio inflows rose steadily over the initial sub-
periods of limited openness and early liberalisation, hitting its peak during the Asian crisis 
before the share took a deep plunge in the recent post-crisis period.  
 
Likewise, Latin America’s share of equity portfolio inflows surged over the initial sub-
periods since the mid-1980s and most of the 1990s. Its share then took a deep plunge 
during the Asian crisis. In contrast to Asia’s rebound, Latin America’s share of equity 
portfolio inflows continued to fall to less than 1% in the recent period of increased 
openness. 
 
EMCs in Asia have thus been absorbing most of the global equity portfolio inflows, 
resulting in the rapid boom in the relative share of equity portfolio capital in Asia’s overall 
capital inflows in the aftermath of the Asian crisis. Equity portfolio inflows in EMEA and 
Latin America, on the other hand, have been losing their importance in their overall share 
of capital inflows since the post crisis period. Over the last two decades, equity portfolio 
inflows in Asia constituted a significant amount of 15.6% of Asia’s overall capital inflows, 
close to 50% higher as compared to relative shares of 10.74% and 10.59% from EMEA and 
Latin America respectively.    
 
Concentration of portfolio equity flows is evident not only among regions but also within 
regions. Table 5 shows that Asian EMCs’ shares of equity portfolio capital into Asia have 
fluctuated significantly over the years. Major recipients of equity portfolio capital in Asia 
include China, India, Korea and Taiwan, claiming a total share of 96.9%, 84.4% and 90.1% 
in 2001, 2002 and 2003 respectively. Among these main recipients, Taiwan embraced a 
huge slice of total Asia’s equity portfolio capital, claiming over 40% of total equity 
portfolio inflows to Asia since 2000. Nonetheless, reasonably high portions of total equity 
portfolio inflows to Asia have also been drawn into China, Korea and India as well.   
 
Table 5: Relative Shares of Equity Portfolio Investment into Asian EMCs 
Year  1997  2001  2002  2003 2004 
Emerging Market 
Country 
Relative Shares of Asia’s Equity Portfolio Inflows 
  
China  82.50% 3.34% 25.24% 12.41%  
India  37.27% 8.68% 13.91% 14.09% 20.22%
Indonesia  -72.73% 1.74% 9.84% 1.82% 4.34%
Korea, Rep of.  36.83% 40.39% 4.44% 23.15% 20.13%
Malaysia     -0.62% 2.15%   
Philippines  -5.92% 1.51% 4.53% 0.74% 0.89%
Singapore  -6.48% -0.84% -4.48% 2.38% 6.18%
Taiwan (China)  -32.55% 44.46% 40.81% 40.46% 29.91%
Thailand  56.41% 1.38% 6.05% 2.87% -1.01%
Sources: Collated by Centennial Group from the IMF's IFS, the Central Bank of Taiwan; also, to fill in 
missing data, CEIC Data and calculations based on the Reserve Bank of India and Indonesia’s Central Bank. 
Notes: For 2004 total, China and Malaysia 2004 values estimated from 2003 data. 
 
Asia’s share of equity portfolio capital relative to its overall capital inflows has changed 
significantly over the last two decades, ranging from a trough of 2.3% in 1985-90 to a peak 
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of 23.84% in 1999–2004. (See Table 6) The liberalisation reforms in many developing 
capital markets in Asia in turn have sparked higher economic growth, enhanced 
creditworthiness and rising corporate profits and market value and thus have undoubtedly 
drawn in equity portfolio capital. As shown earlier, EMCs in Asia, among all the other 
regions, received the highest concentration of global equity portfolio flows.  
 
Table 6: Relative Share of Portfolio Equity in Overall Capital Inflows by Region 
1985-2004 1985-90  1991-96  1997-98  1999-
2004 
Period 




Crisis  Increased 
Openness
EMC Region  Relative Shares of equity portfolio inflows in overall inflows 
Asia 14.7% 2.3% 9.3% 5.24%  23.84%
EMEA
  10.7% 11.12% 12.1% 14.1% 9.0%
Latin America   10.6% -7.3% 17.9% 5.5%  0.9%
Sources: Collated by Centennial Group from the IMF's IFS, Taiwan’s Central Bank; also, to fill in missing 
data, CEIC Data and calculations based on Malaysia’s Dept. of Statistics, India’s and Indonesia’s central 
banks, and the Wall Street Journal.  
Note: 1985-90 Latin America equity inflows were actually positive but all other Latin America investments 
summed negative; hence the negative sign for a positive number. 
 
2.5  Increased competition for portfolio equity capital 
Despite this past concentration of portfolio equity inflows to just a few countries, it is 
important to note that many more EMCs are now opening up their capital markets and 
striving to receive a greater share of global flows of portfolio capital. In the past decade, we 
have seen: 
 
  Countries opening up their capital account: Malaysia has removed virtually all the 
controls it placed on capital flows in September 1998 in response to the Asian financial 
crisis. China and India have gradually eased restrictions on their capital accounts. 
 
  Countries easing restrictions on foreign ownership: For instance, ownership ceilings 
have been eased in countries as divergent as Taiwan, India and Malaysia. In addition, 
such EMCs as China have devised new licensing and other regulations that allow 
approved foreign institutional investors to participate in domestic capital markets—
where before they were not allowed to participate at all.  
 
Consequently, there has been increased competition for capital among EMCs, and new 
favourites have emerged in recent years. As mentioned above, there has been as significant 
change in the list of top ten recipient countries during the past decade. 
 
2.6  Equity portfolio flows have become more important compared to other forms 
of capital. 
Sixth, the relative importance of equity portfolio flows in the overall flows of capital has 
tended to fluctuate significantly. The last two decades have seen sharp fluctuations  in the 
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share of equity portfolio inflows in total capital inflow.(Chart 5). Despite these fluctuations, 
the relative share of equity portfolio flows in overall flows of capital has climbed since the 
1990s. 
 
Chart 5    Chart 6 
Portfolio Equity Inflows Share of Total
Capital Inflows 




























Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Equity Portfolio Inflows Debt Inflows
Total Investment Inflows  Other Investment Inflows 
Source: Collated by Centennial Group from the IMF's IFS, the Central Bank of Taiwan; also, to fill in 
missing data, CEIC Data and calculations based on Malaysia’s Department of Statistics, the Reserve Bank of 
India, Indonesia’s Central Bank and the Wall Street Journal. 
 
In Tables 7 and 8, we can observe that the relative share of equity portfolio flows has 
multiplied nearly three times since the initial stage of limited openness to the recent period 
of increased openness. Though the relative share fell during the Asian crisis, it was quick to 
pick up pace and rebounded sharply right after the crisis, embracing an even higher share 
as compared to its initial growing share in the early liberalisation period before the crisis.  
 
In contrast, net inward debt flows fell significantly after the Asian crisis, but have 
rebounded since 2002, Both the share of domestically raised external debt, as well as that 
of portfolio debt inflows, have risen recently, reflecting enhanced creditworthiness of most 
EMCs particularly in Asia, improvements in domestic debt market infrastructure, 
strengthening of public debt management, liberalization of capital accounts that facilitated 
deepening of domestic financial markets, continuing substitution of bank loans by market 
debt, and better investment  climate. Nevertheless the share of foreign investors in domestic 
debt markets remain small and spotty, although domestic market debt is emerging as an 
important foreign investment destination (See World Bank’s Global Development Finance, 
September 2005, Chapter 4). 
 
With rapid global financial integration, especially after the Asian Crisis, many developing 
capital markets in Asia have gone through substantial reforms leading to increased 
liberalisation and openness to the global market. As a result, equity flows have emerged as 
  13   
a more popular choice of global investors in EMCs compared to traditional debt 
counterparts in the past. However, on the whole, foreign direct investment flows still 
comprise by far the largest share—about two-third-- of overall capital flows to EMCs. 
 
Table 7: Long-term Trends in Global Capital Investment into EMCs 
1985-2004 1985-90  1991-96  1997-98  1999-2004 Period 




Crisis  Increased 
Openness 
Type of Capital Inflow  USD Millions 
Equity Portfolio Inflows  458.3 6.3  158.2   45.4   248.4
Debt Inflows
  518.1 23.3 300.9   100.4   93.6
Foreign Direct Investment   2039.9 114.8 499.1   355.1   1070.8
Other Investment Inflows  558.3 -8.4 320.2   60.1   186.4
Total Investment Inflows  3576.2  1136.0 1278.5   560.9   1600.8
Sources: Collated by Centennial Group from the IMF's IFS, Taiwan’s Central Bank; also, to fill in missing 
data, CEIC Data and calculations based on Malaysia’s Dept. of Statistics, India’s and Indonesia’s central 
banks, and the Wall Street Journal. 
 
Table 8: Relative Shares of Capital Investment into EMC’s 
1985-
2004 
1985-90  1991-96  1997-98  1999-
2004 
Period 




Crisis  Increased 
Openness
Type of Capital Inflow  Relative Shares of Total Capital Inflows to EMCs 
Equity Portfolio Inflows  12.81% 4.64% 12.37% 8.09%  15.52%
Debt Inflows
  14.49% 17.11% 23.54% 17.89% 5.85%
Foreign Direct Investment   57.04% 84.42% 39.04% 63.31%  66.89%
Other Investment Inflows  15.61% -6.17% 25.05% 10.71%  11.64%
Source: Collated by Centennial Group from the IMF's IFS, Taiwan’s Central Bank; also, to fill in missing 
data, CEIC Data and calculations based on Malaysia’s Dept. of Statistics, India’s and Indonesia’s central 
banks, and the Wall Street Journal. 
 
 
In short, portfolio equity flows have been characterised by: 
 
•  A changing pattern of winners and losers. 
•  Massive growth in volumes 
•  Significant volatility 
•  Substantial concentration – both among regions (favouring Asian EMCs) as well as 
within regions.  
•  Equity portfolio flows are growing in importance relative to other types of capital 
flows.  
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Section 3: Determinants of Portfolio Equity Flows 
 
Portfolio equity flows are influenced by conjuncctural and cyclical factors as well as 
structural factors and the institutional environment. Conjunctural factors include: expected 
returns as well as volatility of returns in the destination country relative to mature 
economies. Both are generally influenced by the relative developments in economic growth 
and monetary conditions; developments in return and volatility in the emerging markets  as 
a group can also impact on individual countries in so far as EMC equity is treated as an 
asset class in the portfolio allocation decisions of foreign investors. Further, portfolio 
equity flows also depend on structural factors such as the expected diversification benefits 
reflected in the correlation among returns, the state of development and institutional quality 
of capital markets in the destination countries, and the degree of openness to capital flows. 
3.1  Cyclical factors affecting flows and country/regional shares of portfolio capital 
 
Economic growth and related monetary policy cycles in developed countries, especially the 
United States, appear to have a disproportionately powerful influence over net flows of 
portfolio equity capital to EMCs. There are two basic issues to consider here.  
 
First, easy monetary conditions in the US and other OECD countries tend to create 
conditions of excess liquidity, that in turn may be channelled into investments  primarily 
into financial assets in the developed countries in the first instance. However, some part of 
this will tend to flow into EMCs as portfolio capital.  
 
Second, as easy monetary conditions are prolonged in developed economies, market-
determined yields on financial assets will tend to fall, spurring global investors to search 
for higher-yielding assets elsewhere. If, at the same time, the global economy is growing 
well, global investors’ risk tolerance tends to improve. This often causes these global 
investors to price risk less rigorously—leading to an inflow of portfolio capital into riskier 
assets such as EMCs bonds and equities, and so depressing yields or raising equity 
valuations.  
 
3.2  Expected rates of return appear to be heavily influenced by relative economic 
growth prospects:   
 
Global investors are actively searching for areas and instruments offering attractive returns. 
In analysing the expected rates of return for foreign equities, investors tend to look for 
prospects in the countries’ economic growth and also assess the level of currency risk 
involved. Booming economic growth may not actually produce high equity returns but 
investors do look at relative economic growth rates as a guide to relative returns so long as 
this is likely to be accompanied by a stable or rising exchange rate. So long as the overall 
macro-level indicators are promising, the issue will be more one of the profitability of the 
actual companies they invest in. Thus, corporate profitability is the key. Factors like 
earnings growth, return on equity, and other measures of value creation such as economic 
value-added are all becoming key considerations for global investors. 
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Over the 1991–2004 horizon, notable growth was observed among the Asian economies 
compared to both the EMEA and Latin America regions.  
 
•  Indeed, EMCs in Asia reaped the highest share of global equity portfolio capital 
over this period (Table 3 in Section 2). Despite the declining momentum of growth 
in Asian economies over subsequent periods, Asia’s share of equity portfolio funds 
continued to be high. Such a phenomenon can probably be explained by Asia’s 
sustained growth differential above the other regions over the years. Moreover, 
most of the portfolio capital flows were concentrated in India, China and Korea 
(Table 7), where average growth was significantly higher than most other EMCs.  
 
•  Likewise, equity funds were drawn into EMEA when its average regional growth 
jumped from a negative to a positive during the Asian Crisis, resulting in a 
substantial surge in EMEA’s share of global equity capital (Table 3).  
 
•  Unfortunately, Latin America’s share of equity portfolio capital fell sharply, in part 
due to the relatively slower pace of economic growth there. 
       
Table 9: Weighted Real GDP Growth by Regions 
1991-2004 1991-96  1997-98  1999-2004  Period 
  Early 
Liberalisation
Crisis  Increased 
Openness 
Region  Weighted Real GDP Growth 
Latin America  2.8 3.5 3.5  1.8
Asia 10.2 11.0 10.0  9.4
Europe & Central Asia  -0.2 -9.0 7.7  6.0
Middle East  10.4 13.6 8.7  7.8
Sub-Saharan Africa  4.7 4.3 4.9  5.1
Emerging Markets Total  7.2 6.8 8.2  7.3
*Weighted 3 years moving average of the economies listed, based on 2000 GDP and PPP exchange rates. 
*Brunei’s figures are not included. 
Source: Collated by Centennial Group from Economic Intelligent Unit (EIU) Database. 
3.3  Exchange rate expectations  
 
Especially after sharp exchange rate devaluations in EMCs in 1997-2001, global investors 
became substantially concerned with currency risk. They tend to look carefully at any risk 
of an EMC currency being misaligned. They will also assess longer-term factors that affect 
the sustainability of an EMC’s exchange rate regime—such as the consistency of monetary 
and fiscal policies, current account balances, financial sector sustainability issues such as 
the growth of consumer and corporate debt, etc. 
 
Currency changes have clearly played a role in recent flows into China and Malaysia. Both 
countries saw a surge of flows into equity, bond and real estate markets as expectations that 
their currency pegs would be replaced by a floating currency regime intensified—their 
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currencies were seen as under-valued and therefore likely to appreciate. In China’s case, 
strict capital controls meant that much of the capital that flowed in was hot, unrecorded 
money—which is why the errors and omissions item in the balance of payments turned 
sharply up. This capital flow was also seen to be sensitive to expectations of the currency—
when fears of the overheating of the economy caused investors to revise downwards their 
expectations of currency appreciation, such flows turned negative briefly (Chart 8).  
 
The currency pegs that were followed by these two countries until 21
st July 2005 led to 
sustained central bank interventions over an extended periods to prevent the currency from 
appreciating. These in turn caused a surge in foreign exchange reserves in the past few 
years (Chart 9). 
 
Chart 8    Chart 9 
Speculative flows to China currency   
expectations 
Causing foreign exchange reserves to rise 










































































































































Source: Collated by Centennial Group using CEIC Database 
 
3.4  Sovereign credit ratings  
 
The recent BIS annual report 2004 showed that sovereign credit ratings for both Asia and 
EMEA have been following an improving trend since the end of 1990s, when ratings 
plunged during the Asian Crisis before picking up in the recent years. Not surprisingly, 
equity portfolio flows into Asia fell over subsequent periods in the 1990s and then soared 
in the post-Crisis period (Table 1). Similarly, a rise in the equity flows to EMEA was noted 
following the improvement in its sovereign credit ratings in recent years. On the contrary, 
sovereign credit ratings for Latin America reported all time lows since the 1990s, leading to 
the drastic shrinkage in its equity capital flows since 1991.    
 
3.5  Real interest rate differentials  
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EMCs have generally provided higher real interest rates than the US or other developed 
economies (see Table 10). However, given the higher risk associated with EMCs, the key 
issue has been the quantum of risk premium required to maintain flows of capital into 
EMCs. But the countries are now also vulnerable to sudden changes in global investors’ 
risk appetite. This was seen clearly in April 2004: when expectations of the degree and 
speed of likely tightening of monetary policy in the US changed suddenly, EMC sovereign 
bond spreads over US Treasuries rose suddenly. This was accompanied by a substantial 
increase in financial market volatility, reflecting rapid changes in global asset allocation by 
large investors who reduced their allocation to riskier EMCs as their risk appetite waned.  
 
Table 10: Real Interest Rate Differentials By Regions 
1991-2004  1991-96  1997-98  1999-2004  Period 
  Early 
Liberalisation
Crisis  Increased 
Openness 
Emerging Market Region  Real Interest Rate Differential 
Latin America  59.2 143.3 3.0  -6.2
Asia 2.2 11.7 3.3  -7.7
Europe & Central Asia  -41.6 -73.9 -48.4  -7.0
Middle East  3.0 12.2 3.7  -6.5
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.9 4.4 8.0  -5.0
Emerging Markets Total  4.1 18.9 -7.9  -6.7
*Money market rates deflated by consumer prices minus U.S. real rates. *Brunei’s figures are not included. 
Source: Collated by Centennial Group from Economic Intelligent Unit (EIU) Database. 
 
3.6  Structural Changes that impact on portfolio equity flows 
 
(a) Capital Account Opening in EMCs 
 
A country’s decision to open up and  enhance the access of foreign investors to the equity 
and debt of its companies will attract global investors seeking diversification and new 
opportunities for returns. 
 
There are opportunistic capital flows—e.g., if countries privatize aggressively, that  will 
lead to temporary surges in portfolio capital inflows, as well as more longer-lasting 
improvements in flows driven by fundamental reforms in the capital account regime.   
Country experiences in liberalizing capital flows and in using capital controls to insulate 
the domestic economy from external vulnerabilities raise a host of issues that include the 
following: 
•  Are controls effective in limiting particular forms of capital flows? 
•  Do controls facilitate better macroeconomic policy mix and outcomes?. 
•  Do controls have long-term effects on investor confidence and level of flows? 
•  Does the effectiveness of controls depend upon the type (indirect and market based 
versus direct and administrative) and target of controls?, and 
•  Do capital controls serve a prudential purpose and are prudential policies effective in 
minimizing the risks in cross-border capital flows?  
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In addressing these issues, Arriyoshi et al
2  show that the  effectiveness of controls and the 
benefits of liberalization depend upon a host of factors, including the seriousness of macro-
economic imbalances, administrative capacity  to manage the controls and its liberalization, 
the level of financial market development, and the nature of controls. While the 
effectiveness seems to depend upon country-specific circumstances, properly managed, 
transparent and market-based controls can temporarily help to insulate pressures on 
monetary conditions, and provide the breathing space needed to undertake more basic 
policy and structural adjustments. In addition, well-sequenced domestic financial sector 
development strategy with proper prudential safeguards can provide a basis for an orderly 
process of capital account liberalization. 
 
b) Investibility Issue: Developing Markets and Market Infrastructure 
 
There is some evidence, though not a whole lot, that foreign mutual funds investments in 
emerging markets are significantly linked to security-market infrastructure, shareholder 
rights, and quality of accounting standards (see Aggarwal, Klappen and Wysocki (2003)
3. 
Also, there is evidence that equity-market liberalization, involving an opening up to foreign 
shareholders, is associated with significant increase in share prices and reduction in cost of 
capital (Henry and Lorentzen (2003))
4.  Also, more protection of shareholders is strongly 
associated with the size, efficiency and stability of equity markets (see Garibaldi,Mora, 
Sahay, and Zettlemeger(2002))
5. However, much work remains to be done on the linkages 
between market and institutional structures and the pace of market development. In 
particular additional work on the impact of observance of global regulatory standards on 
the pace and volatility of inflows could provide valuable insights for policy. 
 
Several structural factors play a key role in shaping the perceived returns and riskiness of 
investing in EMC equity securities. These include: 
 
•  First, corporate governance and transparency: The Asian financial crisis highlighted 
the crucial importance of good corporate governance, transparency of management 
and majority shareholders actions affecting companies that foreigners invest in and 
the accuracy of financial accounts presented to the investment community. The 
creation of effective regulatory and supervisory institutions and the formulation of 
appropriate policy frame work for good governance in EMCs have thus become 
important.  
 
                                                 
2 Arriyoshi Akira, Karl Habermeier,  Bernard Laurens, Inci Otker-Robe, Ivan Canales-Kriljenko, and Andrei Kirilenko, 
2000, “Capital Controls: Country Experiences with their Use and Liberalization, Occasional Paper No. 190, Washington 
DC, International Monetary Fund). 
3 Aggarwal, Rena, Leora Klappen and Peter D. Wysocki 2003 “Portfolio Preferences of Foreign Institutional Investors” 
Policy Research Working Paper 3101, WB, Washington, D.C. July.  
4 Peter Blair Henry and Peter Lombund Lorentzen.  “Domestic Capital Market Reform and Access to Global Finance: 
Making Markets Work.”  The Future of Domestic Capital Markets in Development Countries ed. By Robert E. Litan, 
Michael Pomerleane, and V. Sundararajan (editors)  Brookings  Institution Press(2003  Washington D.C.). 
5 Pietro Garibaldi, Nada Mora, Ratra Sahay, and Jeromin Zettlemeger, What Moves Capital to Transition Economies? In 
IMF Staff Papers May 2002, vol 48, Special Issue (IMF, Washington, D.C.). 
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•  Second, market liquidity has also become an important determinant of flows of 
portfolio capital into EMC equities. Global investors typically seek investments in 
which there are significant amounts of daily trading enabling them to buy and sell 
these assets without moving the price against them and also ensuring that they can 
enter and exit these investments easily as and when they desire to.  Market liquidity 
is influenced by both the size and pattern of ownership of listed securities, and the 
micro-structure of the markets, including the trading systems. The creation of a 
liquid security market with efficient trading arrangements is thus  important to 
attract both domestic and foreign investment. 
 
•  Third, several broad structural features that affect the macroeconomic and financial 
stability policy  frameworks, such as the sustainability of exchange rate regime, the 
perceptions of financial system stability, including the debt-equity ratio of 
companies, public debt sustainability, efficiency and soundness of financial 
intermediation etc. will also shape the overall perceptions of costs, risks and returns 
of investing in EMCs. 
 
  (c) Structural Changes in Sources of Portfolio Capital 
 
Developments in developed economies can also play a role. According to evidence 
discussed in the IMF’s  Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR), September 2005 
(Chapter III on Global Asset Allocation), the degree of “Home Bias” in institutional 
investors has declined, with foreign assets often reflecting a range of investment objectives. 
Pension assets, often a very conservative investment group, are increasingly placing 
mandates with broader guidelines, including alternative investments. For all types of 
institutional investors in industrial countries, the share of foreign assets rose between 1997 
and 2003 to an average of 12%, driven by several factors: 1) Greater focus on Asset and 
Liability Management (ALM) by institutional investors; 2) Changes in accounting and 
financial reporting standards; 3). Influence of rating agencies on asset allocation decisions 
of institutional investors such as Insurance companies; and 4) Governance arrangements of 
institutional investors  for asset-allocation decisions.  
 
These factors, combined with the growing availability of investment vehicles and liquid 
markets in many developing and emerging markets, have contributed to a surge in foreign 
capital flows. For instance:  
 
•  World pension assets rose from less than $7 trillion in 1993 to $11 trillion in 1998, 
and are expected to exceed $15 trillion by 2003. In 2003, approximately $655 
billion of the $15 trillion in pension assets is likely to flock to emerging markets. 
The scope and  impact of  such increased flow of capital on the Latin American 
region is analyzed in Savitsky and Burki (Paper #5) 
 
•  Insurance companies’ assets in the OECD surged from close to US$7 trillion in 
1993 to over US$11 trillion in 2001. Likewise, assets in OECD-based investment 
companies which included closed-end and managed investment companies, mutual 
funds and unit investment trusts exploded from slightly over US$4 trillion to over 
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US$11 trillion during the same period. An immense part of these mounting 
institutional assets are expected to be drawn into emerging markets given their rapid 
development and reforms in their capital markets over the recent past.
6    
 
 
                                                 
6 Source: OECD Statistical Databases 
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Section 4: Key  Issues arising from Large Portfolio Flows 
 
Our review of trends and determinants of flows of portfolio equity capital raise several key 
policy questions. 
4.1 Macro-economy  level 
 
First, at the macro-economic level, some fundamental issues arise with regard to the 
relationship between degree of openness of the capital account, the appropriate exchange 
rate regime, and the capacity to insulate domestic monetary conditions, including interest 
rates, from external shocks. The impossibility of controlling all three variables—level of 
capital flows, interest rates and exchange rates—using only two instruments, monetary 
policy and the use of capital controls, raises a host of issues relating to the effectiveness of 
capital controls in insulating domestic monetary conditions, as discussed earlier. 
 
With surges in inflows, the immediate policy response has typically been sterilization, but 
this entails costs and hence some countries have used controls on capital inflows to reduce 
reliance on sterilization, and in some cases to allow time to effect other policy adjustments 
(or in some cases to postpone adjustments). Such controls were typically accompanied by 
other policies, such as liberalization of outflows (Chile, Columbia), increased flexibility of 
exchange rate (India), further strengthening prudential framework and soundness of 
financial systems (Malaysia, Chile and India) and  adjustments in fiscal policies (which has 
varied considerably across countries). In some countries, outflow controls were used 
temporarily to prevent downward pressure on exchange rates in times of crisis, while 
pursuing other policy adjustments to cope with the more basic imbalances that might have 
triggered the outflows (e.g. Malaysia). The tax on short-term capital inflows (using 
unremunerated Reserve Requirements) used by Chile is the most well known example of 
inflow control that has been studied in the literature extensively (for a survey, see 
Williamson (2005)
8. There is evidence that, with the use of such market-based capital 
controls, the authorities obtained some freedom to vary the mix between raising interest 
rates and reducing the inflow of capital, as needed.   
 
With an open capital account, however, the authorities have to build sufficient resilience in 
the financial system and in other economic segments, and sufficient flexibility in the choice 
of macroeconomic policy mix, in order to cope with the inevitable volatility in capital 
flows, while setting in place contingency plans, and reserve cushions to cope with extreme 
volatility that might occur occasionally. Thus careful institutional preparations for an 
effective macroeconomic and financial stability policy framework will be key to managing 
the macro policy consequences of capital account opening. For an analysis  of policy 
responses by EMCs to the recent surges in capital inflows, see the 2004 Annual Report of 
the Bank for International settlements (summarized in Box 1),and GFSR (September, 
2005).  
 
8John Williamson,”Curbing the Boom-Bust Cycle:Stabilizing Capital Flows To Emerging 
Markets”July 2005,  Institute For International Economics, Washington DC. 











































Box 1: Recent Policy Responses towards Surging Equity Portfolio Inflows 
 
The 2004 Annual Report of the Bank for International Settlements reviewed the policy 
responses of several EMCs in response to large capital inflows.  
 
Various policy actions were carried out by countries in response to soaring capital 
inflows. Through 2003, many emerging countries including Brazil, Chile, Russia and 
South Africa allowed their currencies to recover sharply from immense depreciations. 
Consequently, their nominal effective exchange rates appreciated over the year to an 
extent consistent with inflation targets.  
 
Alternatively, actions targeted at dampening exchange rate appreciation encouraged 
outflows and reduced inflows simultaneously as seen in China for example. In response 
to these flows, China acted to lessen exchange restrictions on individual overseas travel, 
encouraged certain types of domestic firms to invest abroad, and initiated a scheme to 
induce domestic institutional investors to increase their outward investment. In order to 
curb inflows, the authorities temporarily suspended approvals of new investment under 
the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors scheme and placed daily limits on the 
conversion of dollars into domestic currency by individuals. Similarly, India liberalised 
investment by domestic companies and financial institutions in overseas assets, allowed 
the prepayment of foreign currency debt by firms, and permitted residents to hold 
foreign currency accounts.  
 
In addition, some countries shifted their attention to depress exchange rate appreciation 
through exchange rate intervention. Emerging Asia has seen a surge in the total reserves 
since 2003 and early 2004. Though motives for accumulating reserves among Asian 
economies varied, foreign currency intervention by central banks’ to resist appreciation 
stemming from surging speculative capital inflows played a crucial stabilizing role. 
Even countries with reasonably flexible exchange rate regimes like India, Korea and 
Thailand also intervened through the foreign currency markets to slow appreciation. 
 
Efforts to limit speculative moves on currency were also practised to tackle exchange 
rate appreciation. Two popular examples are policy responses by Thailand and Korea 
where Thailand limited non-residents’ short-term baht lending in September 2003 and 
subsequently set limits on the amount and maturity of their baht deposits. Korea, on the 
other hand, imposed restrictions on non-deliverable forward markets to dampen 
currency speculation.  
  23   
 
4.2  Dependence on different Types of Portfolio Capital: Portfolio Capital vs. Other 
Forms of Capital Inflow 
 
Once it is accepted that large amounts of foreign capital will be flowing into the country, 
the question of appropriate balance between different forms of capital flows becomes an 
issue. First,  it is desirable to foster a balanced inflow of debt and equity capital in order to 
avoid possible distortions in financial structure of firms and banks that might raise 
vulnerabilities to interest rate and exchange rate  shocks.  Second, historically portfolio 
flows have been much less stable than FDI and subject to greater influence from global 
factors than FDI flows. In addition, some negative correlation between FDI and portfolio 
equity flows has been observed historically for technical reasons of substitutability among 
these two forms of capital. While continued gains in both portfolio equity and FDI are 
desirable, inflows of debt through domestic debt markets would be preferable over debt 
through external markets, as the former reduces currency risks.  
 
Although in principle, countries should favour less volatile forms of capital, such as FDI, 
while maintaining some balance among other forms of flows, in practice, it is not feasible 
to influence the composition with any precision. In discussing as to why capital inflows 
into China have been primarily in the form of FDI, a recent  IMF Working Paper has 
argued
7  that the tax and legal incentives for FDI combined with limited development of 
domestic capital markets serving as a barrier to other forms of capital may have caused the 
observed outcome.  
 
Recent major shifts in composition of capital flows to EMCs toward more volatile portfolio 
capital and loans raises major questions of vulnerability to capital flow reversals (see 2004 
Annual Report of BIS  for an analysis). The policy frame work to moderate the impact of 
such risks assumes particular importance in the current conjuncture, requiring strong macro 
prudential surveillance and flexible macro policy response as emphasized below in Section 
5. 
4.3  Micro-level Issues-Managing risks in Cross Border Capital Flows 
 
As already mentioned, the development of domestic financial markets, strong risk 
management capacity at the individual institutions level, and an effective supervision of   
financial markets and institutions, are some of the components needed to bring about 
orderly liberalization of capital account. Identification of additional risks due to cross 
border capital flows and preparing the institutional capacity to deal with those risks should 
go hand in hand with the use of such liberalization as a tool to strengthen the depth and 
liquidity of domestic financial markets. These considerations call for careful sequencing 
and coordination of domestic and external liberalization policies, and complementing the 
policy package with proper macro prudential surveillance.  
                                                 
9Prasad and Wei (IMF Working Paper /05/79, April 2005) 
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Box 2: Case Study of Malaysia 
Effectiveness of Capital Controls in Malaysia 
 
In September 1998, in response to strong pressures on Malaysian Ringgitt the authorities 
imposed a wide range of controls on capital outflows designed to eliminate the off-shore 
Ringgit market and thereby choking off speculative activity against the Ringgit, while 
pegging the exchange rate, easing fiscal policies to raise capital spending, and 
strengthening prudential framework and financial sector restructuring. A study by 
Arriyoshi, et al (2001) shows that the wide ranging nature of the measures, and their 
strict and effective enforcement by the authorities and commercial banks, seem to have 
been instrumental in effectively eliminating the offshore Ringgit market and  thus 
contributing to containing speculative pressures. The acceptability of measures was 
strengthened by efforts to disseminate information to increase transparency of the 
controls and their efforts to accelerate the financial sector restructuring. Kaminsky and 
Schmulker (2000) find that the controls were successful in lowering interest rates, 
stabilizing the exchange rate, and reducing the co movement of Malaysian overnight 
interest rates with regional interest rates. 
 
Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) provide econometric evidence that the controls and the 
associated policy package allowed a faster recovery from economic crisis and better 
performance than would have been possible in their absence.  
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Section 5: Conclusions and Policy and Strategy Implications 
  
The above analysis and assessment raises key policy questions: 
 
  Regulatory — corporate governance rules (international accounting standards, 
requirements for proper disclosure, etc.); 
  Surveillance — regular assessment of corporate and financial sector vulnerabilities 
needed;  
  Macro-economic — exchange rate regime, capital account. 
 
Since 2001, emerging market equities have generated higher risk-adjusted returns than 
mature equity markets, while emerging market bonds have been one of the best performing 
asset classes. In response, both portfolio equity and debt inflows to emerging markets have 
rebounded from the declines experienced in earlier years. Also, increasing attention to local 
currency bond markets by foreign investors, particularly for sovereign issues, has 
contributed to overall portfolio capital inflows. 
 
However, the levels of portfolio equity inflows, though rising , remain modest in most 
countries, and are concentrated in a few countries like India, Malaysia and China, relative 
to portfolio debt. Flows of portfolio equity have also been volatile, driven by various 
conjunctural factors; while the volatility of equity returns has been high historically relative 
to mature markets. It is true that this volatility seems to have declined in recent years; the 
decline in volatility of mature markets has been more pronounced. In addition, the small 
size and weak infrastructure of many emerging markets have restrained the pace of inflows. 
 
The key issue, therefore, is: What should the strategy be, to promote greater interest from 
foreign investors in emerging equity markets, and to diversify the range of countries that 
benefit from portfolio equity flows?  
 
The strategy can be presented in terms of four policy messages. 
 
1.  Sound macroeconomic management (dealing with the “trilemma”), and effective 
macro prudential surveillance (to monitor the potential unwinding of global 
imbalances and their consequences for domestic financial system); 
 
Flexibility to manage the mix of interest rate, exchange state, and fiscal policies within 
a framework of a flexible exchange rate regime and liberalized interest state 
environment is key to coping with the normal or expected volatility in foreign capital 
flows.  Dealing with unexpected volatility, however, will require proper level of 
international reserves, complimented by appropriate financial safety nets. Market-based 
controls on capital flows may provide some flexibility to the authorities in some 
countries to alter the interest rate–exchange rate mix temporarily (Williamson (2005).  
Ultimately, however, flexible use of all macroeconomic policy instruments would be 
necessary to achieve non-inflationary growth, while smoothing the impact of global 
shocks. 
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The desirable macroeconomic policy mix would, however, depend upon macro-
prudential environment (for example, the relative vulnerability of the financial system 
soundness to exchange rate or interest rate or other shocks) as well as the nature of 
stocks. No a priori prescription is feasible.  In particular, the potential unwinding of 
global imbalances and the associated shifts in exchange rates, interest rates, and other 
asset prices, could have significant impact on the soundness of banks, other financial 
intermediates, and market volatility.  Effective monitoring of this impact—macro 
prudential surveillance— would help to guide macroeconomic policy mix and develop 
complementary prudential policies. In particular, the application of financial 
supervision policies can benefit from the better distinction between the impact of 
common macroeconomic and global shocks affecting the financial system, and the 
institution specific shocks linked to its specific balance-sheet and risk characteristics. 
 
The current conjuncture of increases in more volatile portfolio flows and the potential 
risks on account of unwinding of global imbalances calls for strengthened macro-
prudential surveillance to complement a prompt macro policy response.  
 
 
2.  Development of deep, transparent and liquid domestic stock markets in parallel 
with steps to foster debt markets. 
 
Development of domestic stock markets should be pursued jointly with corporate debt 
market development to foster a balanced access to both debt and equity finance and 
thereby promote both financial stability and efficient allocation of capital. Market 
development policies should be combined with appropriate risk mitigation policies.   
The specific institutional components of a market development program would include: 
•  Improvements in market micro-structure, and in the transparency and governance of 
issuers; and 
•  Improvements in market integrity, including the effectiveness of security market 
regulations and regulatory governance. 
 
Development of domestic capital markets would, however, require a strengthening of 
legal infrastructure, including putting in place a robust insolvency and creditor rights 
regime, which serves as a precondition of effective regulatory framework for both 
banking and capital markets. 
 
3.  Well-planned capital account opening process that will support and reinforce 
market development policies. 
 
Capital account opening policies starting from an initial situation of restrictions on 
inward and outward capital mobility should be managed to support the domestic market 
development strategy.  Capital account opening can be used as a tool to reinforce 
market liquidity, while ensuring that risk mitigation measures take into account the 
specific additional financial risks arising from capital account policies. Sometimes 
institutional capacity may need to be strengthened first before cross border transactions 
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are opened up, while in other circumstances external liberalization can speed up 
domestic reforms. Thus the precise sequencing and coordination of capital account and 
domestic institutional reform measures will be country specific.   Country experiences 
suggest that certain sound principles and  practices can be identified for such 
sequencing of capital account opening and for the coordination of capital account 
measures with domestic financial sector reforms. (Robert Litan, Michael Pomerleano, 
and V.Sundararajan, (Editors) “Future of Domestic Capital Markets in Developing 
Countries”, 2003, Brookings Institutions Press, Washington DC).  
 
4.  Strengthened framework for financial policy transparency to inform global 
investors of the quality of domestic markets and regulatory governance. 
 
The good practices in market infrastructure and market integrity are effectively captured in 
IOSCO Security Market Regulatory principles.  Transparency of the authorities regarding 
their observance of these principles would be an effective means to inform global investors 
and derive the full benefits of domestic market development and capital account opening 
program.  More generally, adoption of good practices in the transparency of monetary and 
financial policies, supported by good data dissemination practices, is a desirable component 
of overall market development. As markets develop, the scope and forms of transparency 





Prepared by Manu Bhaskaran, V Sundararajan and Harinder Kohli 
Centennial Group 
November 2005 
  28   
Annex 1:List of Emerging Market Countries 
 
 
There is some debate as to how to define emerging market economies and therefore which 
countries should be included in any list of EMCs. For purposes of this paper, we have used 
a relatively broad definition to include countries which are both of most interest to 
international investors at this time and which compete with each other in attracting 
international private capital flows. The list we have chosen corresponds to the list and 
definitions of EMCs used by international investors and also by journals such as the 
Economist. While most of these countries are middle or upper middle countries developing 
countries in Asia, Europe and Latin America, we also include some low middle income and 
low income countries (e.g. China, India, Vietnam, Kenya, Nigeria, Bolivia etc.) which are 
capable of attracting significant capital flows as well as the so called “tiger” countries in 
Asia spawned the original club of the EMCs and whose economic policies are both 
emulated in and intertwined with rest of emerging Asia.  
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Latin America Asia Europe & Central Asia
Middle East Sub-Saharan Africa Total
 
Sources: Collated by Centennial Group from the IMF's IFS and the Central Bank of 
Taiwan; also, to fill in missing data, CEIC Data and calculations based on the 
Reserve Bank of India. 
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Latin America Asia Europe & Central Asia
Middle East Sub-Saharan Africa Total
 
 
Sources: Collated by Centennial Group from the IMF's IFS and the Central Bank of 
Taiwan; also, to fill in missing data, CEIC Data and calculations based on 
Indonesia's central bank. 
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Latin America Asia Europe & Central Asia
Middle East Sub-Saharan Africa Total
 
Source: Collated by Centennial Group from the IMF's IFS and Taiwan's Central 
Bank; also, to complete data, CEIC, Malaysia's Statistics Dept, the Wall Street 
Journal, and India's and Indonesia's central banks. 
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Latin America Asia Europe & Central Asia
Middle East Sub-Saharan Africa Total
 
Sources: Collated by Centennial Group from the IMF's IFS and the Central Bank of 
Taiwan; also, to fill in missing data, CEIC Data and calculations based on the 
Reserve Bank of India. 
Note: Some data missing for Mexico (1996-97), China (2004), Malaysia (1999, 
2000, 2004) and the Slovak Republic (2004). 
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